Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Peggy Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc.,
Bert Harry : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Respondent.
John B. Anderson; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Peggy Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., Bert Harry, No. 14119.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1227

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
AW LIBRARY

T
L

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

S

EP 15 1975

KKHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Gaife Law School

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

l4ltf

CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,"
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

An Appeal From the Judgment Entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, The Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Judge

JOHN B. ANDERSON
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants
E. H. FANKHAUSER
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
QCT',1 -1975

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsCase No.

Mlltf

CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

An Appeal From the Judgment Entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, The Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Judge

JOHN B. ANDERSON
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants
E. H. FANKHAUSER
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsCase No,
CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

An Appeal From the Judgment Entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, The Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Judge

JOHN B. ANDERSON
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants
E. H. FANKHAUSER
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S SUBMISSION OF PROPOSITION
NO. 2 TO THE JURY WITHOUT GUIDING INSTRUCTIONS
AS TO THE LAW GOVERNING THE PROPOSITION TO BE
ANSWERED WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
TO ESTABLISH FRAUD BY THE APPELLANTS JUSTIFYING
AWARDING RESCISSION TO RESPONDENT
CONCLUSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CASES
Page
Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14,
515 Pac. 41 (1973)

8

Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 470, 473 (1946)..

11

Chapman v. Troy Laundry, 47 P.2d 1054 (Utah 1935)

11

Engle v. Farrell, 75 Cal.App. 2d 612,
171 P.2d 588 (1946)

8

Fleming v. Fleming Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293,
323 P.2d 712 (1958)v

11

Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37 (1897)

11

Koch v. Sky Tech, Inc., 263 Ore. 425,
502 P.2d 1367 (1972)

8,9

Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926)

10

Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865 (1954)

7

Niles v. U.S. Ozocerite, 38 Utah 367, 113 Pac.
1038 (1911)

11

Oldber v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947)

11

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952)

11

Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404,
274 Pac. 856 (1929)

11

Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473 (1935)

11

Slide Mines, Inc. v. Denver Equipment Co.,
112 Colo. 285, 148 P.2d 1009 (1944)
Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495,
227 Pac. 791 (1924)
Universal CIT v. Schom, 15 Utah 2d 262,
391 P.2d 293 (1964)
Vinneau v. Golde, 50 Wash. 2d 39,
309 P.2d 376 (1957)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
10,11
11
9

STATUTES
Page
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 51

l

7
MISCELLANEOUS

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 386

7

37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 69

8

37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 131

9

McCormick, Evidence, 2d ed. § 340
Restatement of Restitution §§ 64 and 68

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
„

8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

-vsCONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants, Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., and Bert
Harry, appeal from a judgment in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, upon jury
trial, submitted on special interrogatories, awarding judgment
to the respondent on a claim of respondent's that a contract
entered into between the parties was induced by fraud of appellants,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 1, 1973, respondent filed her complaint in the
District Court of Salt Lake County seeking various forms of
relief against the appellants arising from a contract and
lease between appellants and respondent involving the
acquisition by the respondent of the In-and-Out Dry Cleaners
(T. 161). Preliminary proceedings and discovery were duly
had, an amended complaint was filed on November 12, 1973.
An answer and counterclaim were filed by the appellants (T. 129).
The matter was tried upon jury trial beginning March 12, 1975,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-2and was submitted to the jury on special verdict on the 17th
day of March, 1975. Judgment on the special verdict was duly
entered on the 29th day of April, 1975, and subsequent post-trial
motions were filed and disposed of by the trial court.

Appeal from

the judgment was timely filed for review by this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse and
order a new trial, or in the alternative to reverse with instructions
to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, Peggy Bezner, had operated a dry cleaning
establishment in Granger, Utah from 1962 to 1965 (T. 85). She
had operated an establishment known as the Peggy B for approximately four years (T. 127). She was interested in purchasing
a dry cleaning establishment in Salt Lake City (T. 7). She came
to Utah from Omaha, Nebraska, and examined an establishment
known as In-and-Out Cleaners (T. 7, 87). She was interested
in purchasing the business with Richard B. Steadman (T. 7) and
was shown the establishment by Ludwig Zorn of Alliance Equipment
Company (T. 208,209).

According to the testimony of respondent

Peggy Bezner, she met with the appellant Gordon E. Harry, the
owner of Continental Dry Cleaners and In-and-Out Cleaners in the
latter part of August, 1972 (T. 87, 9). There were approximately two
conversations among Mr. Steadman, the appellant, and respondent
and Mr. Zorn.

According to Mr. Steadman, he and the respondent

met with Mr. Harry around August 24th at the Continental
Cleaners plant.

Mr. Harry stated he wanted $40,000 for In-and-Out
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-3Cleaners because the operation consisted of $31,000 of equipment,
inventory and goodwill and that the business "was at the time
grossing in the vicinity of a thousand dollars a week.11 (T. 15)
The respondent Peggy Bezner also testified that at the first
meeting she met with Mr. Zorn, Mr. Steadman and Mr. Harry and
fl

it was said that the shop was doing about a thousand dollars

a week.11 (T. 88).
According to the appellant, Gordon E. Harry, nothing was said
the time of the second meeting about the volume of business.
According to Mr. Harry, at the first meeting he stated that the
operation was designed to do a thousand dollars a week.

At that

meeting Mr. Harry stated that the weeks had been as small as $250
to as much as $600 a week and that there was Army work being done
by In-and-Out Cleaners that was comingled with Continental Dry
Cleaners' operations (R. 162). Mr. Zorn testified that at the
first conversation in August, at Continental Dry Cleaners, the
volume was stated to be $500 to $600 per week but that it could do
as high as $1,000 a week if it had proper management.
210).

(TG 209,

Both the respondent, Mrs. Bezner,and Mr. Steadman testified

that Mr. Harry had indicated that he was having management trouble
(T. 23, 89).
Mr. Steadman testified that a second meeting was held on
Saturday, August 26th, at the Continental plant at which time
he and the appellant suggested a counter offer which was rejected.
The counter offer was for $35,000 and the appellant, Mr. Harry,
said that he would have to have $40,000 based upon the equipment
and the volume of about a thousand dollars per week (T. 18).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4The possibility of a partnership was also discussed but rejected
by respondent (T. 18). Mrs. Bezner acknowledged that no records
were presented to her because Harry stated he was having management
problems (R. 91). Respondent acknowledged that she was advised
by appellant Harry that the In-and-Out Cleaners was being exploited
by the manager (R. 131). The respondent decided to buy In-and-Out
Cleaners contending that she relied upon the thousand dollar a
week assertion as to the volume of business being done by the
cleaning establishment (T. 93). A purchase agreement and lease
were eventually signed and the respondent took over the business
on October 2nd.

According to Lillian Harry, wife of the appellant,

Mrs. Bezner was present many times at the In-and-Out Cleaners
before taking possession, inspected the cleaners, and inspected
the receipt book for the company (T. 196-198).

Mrs. Harry had

offered to work for Mrs. Bezner and, in fact, did work approximately a week for her (T. 201). Mrs. Bezner acknowledged that she
took possession in October of 1972 and that everything seemed
all right and that she was satisfied with the equipment.

(T. 136).

Mr. Harry testified that he advised the respondent that all the
records were on the premises of the In-and-Out Cleaners and respondent acknowledged that she found a box of business records
on the premises (T. 116-118).

Mr.

Steadman shortly after the

agreement terminated his association with Mrs. Bezner (T. 31)
and Mrs. Bezner occupied the premises conducting the business
under the terms of the written sales contract and lease including
the making of monthly payments until July, 1973.

No written

guarantees were ever given as to what the business was grossing
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-5and respondent made no effort to contact Mr. Harry when her gross sales
did not approximate the figure she testified they were supposed
to approximate (T. 99, 140). She operated the business until
October 1, 1973, although she terminated the rents in July (T. 133).
A Notice to Quit premises was served by the appellant on Mrs. Bezner
on September 21, 1973 (T. 143). Mrs. Bezner testified that the
business did approximately $400-$500 a week and was falling off.
(T. 105).
Mrs. Harry testified that during the time she was operating
the shop before the respondent assumed possession, that the weekly
take would vary and that there were $100 to $500 days (T. 203).
Katherine Winters, an employee of In-and-Out Cleaners, could not
recall a $500 day (T. 217). Mr. Perry Kiter, who assumed the
operation of the Cleaners after the respondent left, indicated
the operation did $1,100 a week on the grand opening and there
were 18 weeks over $900 unaffected by any raise in prices (T. 73-80).
The trial court submitted the case to the jury on special
verdict.

(R. 40 and 41).

Proposition No. 2 submitted to the

jury was as follows:
That the plaintiff Peggy Bezner, after
having learned that the cleaning business
had not been grossing approximately $1000
per week, continued to operate the business
as her own and failed to notify the defendants
with reasonable promptness her decision to
disaffirm and rescind the contracts of sale
of the business and the lease.
At the time of trial counsel for the appellant submitted a
requested instruction on the doctrine of waiver. (R. 82, 89).
Exception was taken to failure to give an instruction on waiver
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-6as set forth in the request (R. 89, T. 242). The jury duly
answered the special verdict and a judgment on the verdict was
entered in favor of respondent for $10,670 for rescission of the
contract including the approximately $10,000 paid down by the
respondent (T. 149, R. 29,30).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT1S SUBMISSION OF PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE
JURY WITHOUT GUIDING INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE LAW GOVERNING
THE PROPOSITION TO BE ANSWERED WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The trial court submitted a proposition to the jury embodying
the question as to whether the appellant Mrs. Bezner failed to
notify the defendants with reasonable promptness to disaffirm
and rescind her contract.

The jury was thus left with answering

the question as to whether the respondent had acted reasonably
after being aware of the alleged fraud that induced the contract
and whether she acted reasonably to disaffirm the contract.
However, nowhere in the court's instructions on the law, which
were given to the jury as guidelines as to how to answer the
special verdict questions, was there any instruction on what would
constitute a waiver or ratification as a matter of law or any
guidelines as to what the law would recognize as a valid waiver.
The jury was thus left in a situation of having to answer a
question without their having been given any instruction
from the court as to the applicable legal standards to be employed
in answering the question.

The jury could only have answered the

special verdict without reference to the applicable law and on a
visceral and uninformed basis.
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-7Counsel for the appellant expressly requested the trial court
to give two instructions relative to the second proposition upon
which the jury was to pass.

Exception was duly taken to the

failure of the court to give one instruction on the issue.
Consequently, there was compliance with Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, if the issue was properly raised9

the failure of the court to instruct on the matter would obviously
be reversible error.
(1954).

Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865

In Lewis v. White, supra, this court held the failure

to give a requested instruction in a fraud action constituted
error.

The court noted:
"It was their duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under
the circumstances would dictate; whether
this required them to make further inquiry
concerning the income, and if so, the extent
thereof was for the jury to determine.
In their request No. 4, the plaintiffs
asked the court to instruct the jury concerning
this element. They also duly excepted to
the court's refusal, fto instruct the jury
that it must find that the defendants must
reasonably have relied upon the misrepresentations of the plaintiff, if any.1 The matter
was thus adequately called to the court's
attention."

This court held the failure to give a proper instruction on
theory of the case was prejudicial error.
In 37 Am.Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 386, it is stated:
Fraud or misrepresentation may be waived.
It is a general rule that there can be no
rescission of a transaction or contract for
fraud where the fraud has been waived by the
party who has been wronged. Likewise, the
principle is well settled that a person
defrauded in a transaction may, by conduct
inconsistent with an intention to sue for
damages for the fraud, waive the right to
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-8sue. Waiver in this sense is employed
loosely by some of the authorities, including
not only a consentual waiver, but a relinquishment of rights and powers akin to
estoppel. If, with full knowledge of the
fraud and his rights, a defrauded party
intentionally waives or condones it, he
cannot thereafter claim damages for the
fraud.
A similar standard is observed in 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 69, where
it is observed:
Thus, while the defrauded party may
retain what he has received, stand to its
bargain, and recover for the loss caused
him by the fraud, he cannot maintain an
action for the original wrong practiced
on him where, with full knowledge of all
the material facts, he does an act which
indicates his intention to stand to the
contract and waive all right of action for
the fraud.
The defense of waiver ratification or estoppel to a fraud action
is clearly recognized by cases and other authority.
Farrell, 75 Cal. App. 2d 612, 171 P.2d 588 (1946).

Engle v.
In

Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 Pac. 41 (1973), the
Arizona court observed:
As noted above, Mr. Beauchamp certainly
knew in April 1968 that the truck had been
manufactured in 1966. Assuming arguendo that
such fact would constitute a basis for rescission, the jury may well have concluded
that appellants had waived their right to
rescind. A purchaser may waive or lose the
right to rescind a contract for fraud, breach
of warranty, or failure of the article
purchased to conform to the contract if he
uses it as his own property, for his own
benefit or convenience, after he has
knowledge of the grounds for rescission.
See also, Restatement of Restitution, §§ 64 and 68; Koch v. Sky
Tech, Inc., 263 Ore. 425, 502 P.2d 1367 (1972).

It has been

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9repeatedly said by the courts that the question of waiver, estoppel
or ratification is a question of fact to be decided by the trier
of fact. Vinneau v. Golde, 50 Wash. 2d 39, 309 P.2d 376 (1957);
Slide Mines, Inc. v. Denver Equipment Co., 112 Colo. 285, 148 P.2d
1009 (1944); 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 131.
The only question raised by this point on appeal is whether
the jury was entitled to be given some guiding instructions on the
issue of waiver.

The facts in the instant case showed that res-

pondent retained possession of the premises for approximately a year
after entering into the agreement and taking control of the
premises; that she saw the records as to how the business had
been doing before her stewardship and she became experienced in
the operation of the business and knew how much profit it was making.
At no time did she contact the appellant concerning the alleged
representation that the business would make a gross profit in excess
of what she was experiencing.

A substantial amount of evidence

points to a reasonable inference that respondent intended to accept
the contract and the bargain and that when she felt she could no
longer make it, she then resorted to a claim that she was defrauded.
She made payments under the contract and lease for a period of
several months after accepting possession until July 1972. Cf.
Koch v. Sky Tech., Inc., supra.

The evidence justified the

submission to the jury of the question formulated in Proposition No.
2, but, more importantly, it justified the submission of a proper
legal instruction to the jury as to what conduct could constitute
a waiver on the part of respondent.

The trial court's rejection of

any instruction that gave the jury guidelines as to the appropriate
standard of law to be applied and at the same time submitting a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10proposition to the jury could only have left the jury open to follow
its own whim and caprice and to deny the appellants a properly
informed jury on an important proposition to appellant's defense.
It cannot be said that the failure to adequately instruct the jury
under the circumstances was harmless error.

The jury simply did not

have the law on a vital issue upon which it was asked to make a
decision.

This court should reverse and grant a new trial with

instructions to the trial court to properly inform the jury on the
legal standard of waiver.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
ESTABLISH FRAUD BY THE APPELLANTS JUSTIFYING AWARDING
RESCISSION TO RESPONDENT.
It is respectfully submitted that there was insufficient
evidence as a matter of law to. establish fraud upon the part
of the appellants and that as an alternative to granting a
new trial for the error alleged in Point I of this brief, the
court should reverse and order respondent's complaint dismissed.
In Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac.
791 (1924), this court made a definitive pronouncement as to the
elements of fraud in a civil case.

Speaking through Justice

Thurman, the court observed:
fl

It may be stated generally that the
elements of actual fraud consist of:
(1) a representation; (2) it's falsity;
(3) it's materiality; (4) the spoken
knowledge of it's falsity or ignorance
of it's truth; (5) the intent that it
should be acted upon by the person and
in the manner reasonably contemplated."

This court has observed that fraud is never presumed and
must be proved.

Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11And, it will not be presumed where there is any other reasonable
explanation other than that of fraud.
38 Utah 367, 113 Pac. 1038 (1911).

Niles v. U.S. Ozocerite,

The burden that the party

alleging fraud must meet before such a determination can be
sustained is that of clear and convincing evidence.

Universal

CIT v. Schom, 15 Utah 2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964); Rawson v. Hardy,
88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473 (1935); Chapman v. Troy Laundry, 47 P.2d
1054 (Utah 1935).

As noted from the Stuck case above, in order

to make out fraud there must be a wilful misrepresentation with
the intent that it should be acted upon by the person to whom
it was directed, Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37 (1897),
or a knowing false representation.

Fleming v. Fleming Felt Co.,

7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712 (1958); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141,
247 P.2d 273 (1952); Oldber v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229
(1947).
made.

Fraudulent intent must exist when the representation is
Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 Pac. 856 (1929).

The requirement of clear and convincing evidence means more than
merely satisfying the jury of the truth of the allegation urged.
It means offering evidence that must persuade the jury that the
truth of the contention is highly probable.
2d Ed. § 340.

McCormick, Evidence,

Clear and convincing, this court has said, means:

"clear, unequivocable, satisfying and convincing.11
110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 470, 473 (1946).

Capps v. Capps,

It is submitted that the

evidence in the instant case does not meet the expressed standard.
According to Mr. Steadman, a party to the contract at one time
when Mr. Harry made his representation at the first meeting in
late August, he stated that he wanted $40,000 for In-and-Out
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12Cleaners because there was $31,000 worth of equipment, inventory
and good will and the business was grossing

!!

in the vicinity" of

a thousand dollars a week (T. 15). Mrs. Bezner's testimony was
that the representation was that the business was doing "about11
a thousand a week (T. 88). Steadmanfs testimony with reference
to reliance was that they relied upon the business producing
"approximately a thousand a week revenue" (T. 29).
On the other side, Mr. Harry's testimony was that the only
representation made was at the first meeting and he stated that the
In-and-Out Cleaners was designed to do a thousand dollars a week and
that it was doing $250 to as much as $600 and that he thought it was
doing better.

He also indicated that he was sending

2000 pieces

of Army work per week comingled with Continental Cleaners (T. 162).
Only one witness testified who was not a party to the transaction.

That was Ludwig Zorn, who was present at the time when both

meetings occurred.

His testimony corroborated Harry's indicating

that the representation was that the volume was about $500 to $600
per week and that it could do $1000 a week if it had proper management.

Further, no written guarantees or representations were placed

in the contract.

If a party had really had such a representation

and wanted to protect against approximations, the contract probably
would have recited the represented volume of business.

Further,

testimony of Perry Kiter,who took over the Cleaners after respondent
terminated, stated that the Cleaners did $1,100 on the week of the
grand opening and has had 18 weeks over $900.

Mrs. Harry indi-

cated that Mrs. Bezner had inspected the Cleaners and had inspected
the receipt book (T. 196-198) showing the cash intake from the
operation of the Cleaners.
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-13It is submitted that with the posture of the evidence being
as outlined that the standard of clear and convincing proof has not
been met as a matter of law.

Admittedly substantial weight must

be given to the jury's determination; but when it appears that
the jury's findings must have been based on the application of
a standard less than that required by law, the jury verdict
should not stand.

It is respectfully submitted that the standard

of clear and convincing evidence was not met and this court should
order judgment for the appellants.
CONCLUSION
The instant case presents a fairly simple form of error
on the part of the trial court.

The court simply did not

instruct the jury on a key issue that the jury was required
to decide and which was presented to them in the form of a
special verdict.

The absence of instruction on a critical

issue left the jury uninformed on the law.

A new trial is

therefore essential as prejudicial error clearly resulted in
a prior procedure.

Further, it is submitted that the evidence

when viewed in light of the applicable standard and burden
of proof which respondent was required to bear simply was
insufficient to prove fraud on the part of the appellants.
It is respectfully submitted that this court in so viewing
the evidence should order judgment for the appellant.
Respectfully submitted

JOHN B. ANDERSON
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney

for Appellants
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